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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
Directorate of Intelligence 
25 August 1967 
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM 
Military Aspects of Rumania's Independent 
Policy Within the Warsaw Pact 
This spring, a group of military 
attaches posted in Moscow were wondering 
who would replace Marshal Grechko as com-
mander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces. 
"If it were up to Rumania," remarked the 
Rumanian to a colleague, "there would be 
no one. " 
Summary 
During the past three years, Rumania has so 
sharply reduced its participation in the Warsaw 
Pact that it cannot now be considered an active 
member. Bucharest has challenged Moscow's authority 
to direct the activities of Rumanian troops. The 
present regime would not willingly commit these 
troops to a European war begun by Moscow. 
Despite its objections to the Pact, the 
Ceausescu government is unlikely to repudiate 
membership, as the Albanians have done. The regime 
has publicly committed itself to uphold its Pact 
obligations so long as NATO exists and to partici-
pate in Pact exercises. It intends to see that 
critical decisions affecting Rumania's armed forces 
are made in Bucharest, however, rather than in 
Moscow. In this respect, Rumania's policy now 
resembles that of Yugoslavia. 
Note: This memorandum was produced by CIA. It was 
prepared by the Office of Strategic Research and 
coordinated with the Office of Current InteZligence 
and the Office of National Estimates. 
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An important factor influencing the regime's 
course is the pressure--economic, political, and 
military--that Moscow might apply if Rumania should 
leave the Pact. Bucharest realizes it can do much 
to lighten the burden of membership without making 
a formal break. Withdrawal would adversely affect 
relations with some "Socialist" countries, but 
membership does not unduly hamper the development 
of closer relations with non-Communist governments. 
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NOTE1 Most notive con1criph In Eo11 
Germany nrve 14 month•; in lluinonia, 16 
months; in the other East European ,.oct 
armies. 24 months1 and in the Sovi•I 
ormed forces , 36 months. Prior lo the oo&k 
conscript lerm cul lrom 24 to 16 month1, 
there were oboul 277,000 llumanion mili· 
tary personnel, including, among other types 
of forces, about 25,000 labor troop• and 
9,000 novol personnel. The present toJol 
lor llumania still includes 25,000/abortroapA. 
and B,000 naval parionn•I. 
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Background of the Military Differences 
1. Important milestones in Rumania's search 
for political and economic independence from Moscow 
were achieved in 1954, when the Soviet-Rumanian 
joint economic enterprises began to be disbanded 
and in 1958, when Soviet troops were withdrawn f;om 
the country. Between 1958 and 1964 Rurnania greatly 
expanded its economic and political contacts in non-
Cornrnunist countries. In April 1964 Bucharest an-
nounced its "declaration of independence," which 
unequivocally asserted Rumania's right to national 
autonomy and equality in the Communist world. 
2. Rumania's military policy toward the USSR 
has reflected the economic and political relations 
between the countries. The Rumanian military 
establishment did not break with the Soviet military 
on its own initiative. Rather, the high command has 
remained loyal to the government and has carried 
out the policy toward the Warsaw Pact laid down by 
the regime. Those few senior officers who evidently 
were unwilling to accept this policy either have 
been demoted or were released from service in 1965 
and 1966. 
3. The first change in the Soviet-Rumanian 
military relationship was detected in 1962-63, when 
the De j regime persuaded Moscow to recall the Soviet 
KGB advisers monitoring the activities of the Rumanian 
intelligence community. Among the organizations from 
which the Soviets were removed were the military 
counterintelligence section of the General Directorate 
of State Security and the Armed Forces Intelligence 
Directorate. The withdrawal of the Soviets probably 
l ed to a decline in intelligence exchange between 
JI Rumanj a and the USSB, I r 
4. A more serious disruption occurred in Sep-
t e mber 1966, when the Armed Forces Intelligence 
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Directorate refused to send a representative to an 
important Pact intelligence conference in Prague. 
As a result, l 
the Rumani ans-"""'":w~e~r~e-n'."""o-t~ .... i-n-v-i."""' t~e"""ld~t-o-a--s""':'i-m-i~. l~a-r_m_e_e_t......,..i_n_g___. 
in February 1967. The purpose of the Prague confer-
ences was to evaluate recent NATO exercises, to 
discuss procedures for improving radio communications 
among intelligence organizations, and to improve the 
exchange of information during international crises. 
I 
5. The Armed Forces Intelligence Directorate's 
present activities probably reflect its discovery, 
sometime prior to the fall of 1966, of a combined 
Soviet, Czechoslovak and Hun arian intell' t 
directed against Rumania. 
Bucharest has 
L..r---......,....,.~-~"'T"":'--------------:--:----------:---:-
i nit i. ate its own operations against "Soviet Bloc 
countries." In June of this year the ._I __________ ~--
) I asked the US naval attach~ 
for information on Soviet naval operations in the 
Mediterranean--a further indication that the Rumanians 
are collecting intelligence on Warsaw Pact forces. 
Training and Equipment Problems 
6. Rumanian officials continue to endorse "col-
laboration and joint battle training with the fraternal 
armies." Many ha.ve complained privately, however, 
that during some Pact maneuvers the Soviets invented 
absurd and unrealistic situations involving the 
simulated use of weapons not even in the inventories 
of the participating countries. 
7. Only a few selected ground force battalions 
from Rurnania took part in the Pact exercises held in 
Bulgaria in 1964 and 1967. During the past three years 
Rwnanian naval and air defense units also have conducted 
a few minor exercises with the Soviets and Bulgarians. 
-4-
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The Rumanians are likely to contribute only token 
forces at most to future Pact exercises, and then 
only under direct pressure from Moscow. 
8. The types of training emphasized during 
the past three years suggest greater concern for 
Rumania's national defense than for potential Pact 
operations. Bucharest has concentrated on devel-
oping the combat effectiveness and esprit of its 
mountain troops, although these troops would not be 
useful in the initial stages of Pact offensive or 
defensive operations. They most likely would be 
employed against an aggressor who intended to occupy 
Rurnania for an extended period. 
9. The performance of the Rumanian Navy, 
which could augment Pact forces in the Black Sea, 
remains conspicuously poor. A high Rumanian of-
ficial claimed recently that the navy is to become 
primarily a training facility for the merchant 
marine. 
10. The Rumanians are taking steps 
themselves less dependent upon the USSR 




forces minister Ionita 
--~~~~~~~--, 
~~---stated this year that 
~5X1C JRumania will devote greater 




groductiQ~ of armament~ I. 
I J, tne party presidium 
has formulated an ambi-
tious plan for the produc-
tion of rockets, high~ 
performance aircraft, ar-
tillery, armor, transport 
vehicles, and sophisticated 
communications e ui men 
e program is inten e to 
give Rumania its political 
and military independence 
from the USSR I I 
JIL ______ ___. 
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military officers are pressing the regime to provide 
new military equipment. One purpose of the produc-
tion plan, the funding of which appears to be beyond 
Rumania's present capabilities, may be to solidify 
military support for the government with a long-terrn 
promise of improvement. 
11. The USSR may have sparked Rumania's deci-
sion to reduce its dependence on the Soviets for 
military equipment. In 1965 both Pact conunander 
Grechko and party secretary Brezhnev annoyed the 
Rumanians by urging them to step up equipment pur-
chases from the USSR. The Soviets also are reported 
to have assigned Rumania the task of manufacturing 
spare parts for obsolescent military hardware. To 
fulfill the assignment, Rurnania would have had to 
purchase machinery that could not be used to manu-
facture anything else. 
Evasion of Moscow's Authority 
12. Some Rumanian officials have voiced fears 
of a violent Soviet reaction if Rurnania were formally 
to renounce its Pact membership. Ceausescu himself 
I·'. 
~5X1D 
Runtanian Party General Secretary HICOL.AE CEAUSESCU 
and his Soviet counterpart LEONID BREZHNEV 
~sx1A ) .__I _ _ 
(November 1966) 
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:eportedly wa;ned Rumanian foreign off ice personnel 
in 196~ that the Russians would crush us if they 
were g7ven the <;'PPOrtunity." One possible plan, 
~nvolving the withdrawal of Rurnania from the Pact 
in conjunction with the withdrawal of Greece and 
Turkey from NATO and the signing of a Balkan non-
aggression agreement, allegedly was considered in 
1964 but dropped as being impractical. 
14. Both Ceausescu and Ionita told the 
Rumanian National Assembly in July that Bucharest 
will remain in the Pact as long as NATO exists. 
Even while retaining their membership the Rumanians 
have been able gradually to erode Moscow's control 
over the Rumanian military estat· lishment. When 
Grechko c·omplained in 1965 that the Rumanian repre-
sentatives in Pact headquarters had been insubordinate, 
the Rumanian armed forces minister replied that 
Bucharest was the proper judge of what Pact orders 
would be obeyed by the Rumanian armed forces. This 
response was tantamount to rejection of the Pact 
chain of co~and established in 1955, under which the 
East European defense ministers are deputy commanders 
of the Pact armed forces and thus subject to direct 
orders of the commander. The Rurnanians are believed 
to have objected strongly to Soviet efforts made in 
1965 and 1966 to expand the number of Rumanian units 
formally committed to the Pact's Combined Command. 
It is highly unlikely that Bucharest now considers 
any of its armed forces so ~ommitted. 
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15. In early 1966 Rumania reportedly circulated 
a proposal calling for Moscow to consult the other 
Pact members before making decisions on critical 
issues. Bucharest also is reported tc have asked 
that the top Pact command positions be rotated among 
the East European members, that the East Europeans 
be charged less for the Soviet troops stationed on 
their soil, and that the numbers of these troops 
be reduced. Rurnania already had taken steps in 
1964 to cut its own military force mainly by reduc-
ing the obligation of conscripts from 24 to 16 
months. The Soviets are reported to have been par-
ticularly displeased. 
16. This year, Rumania's intransigence ap-
parently delayed for several months the formal 
appointment of Soviet Marshal Yakubovskiy to succeed 
Grechko as Pact commander. Ceausescu's declaration 
on 17 June that each Pact partner "must possess its 
own supreme command" was a clear warning that the 
new cornrnander could expect no more cooperation than 
his predecessor. 
17. The Rumanians believe there is a degree 
of sympathy for their anti-Soviet stand in Poland 
and Czechoslovakia, and perhaps even in Hungary 
and Bulgaria. Only in East Germany is there no 
warmth for the Rumanian position and no opposition 
to Moscow. Bucharest apparently recognizes, how-
ever, that its East European colleagues are not 
questioning the usefulness of the Pact, as Rumania 
does, but only the mechanics of its operation. 
The Rumanians in Wartime 
18. Since embarking on its independent policy, 
Rumania has revised the legal procedure necessary 
for it to declare war. The 1965 constitution1 though 
upholding Rumania's commitment to the.Warsaw Pact, 
contains an addendum to the 1952 version that ap-
pears designed to eliminate an obligation to become 
involved in an "undesirable" war. Whereas the 
earlier constitution stated that "obligations of 
-8-
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mutual defense deriving from international treaties" 
represented a basis for the declaration of war, 
the new document states that the Rumanian parlia-
ment can declare war 
" ••• only in the case of armed aggression 
directed against the Socialist Republic of 
Rurnania or against another state toward 
which the Socialist Republic of Rumania has 
mutual defense obligations arising from 
international treaties, if such a situation 
has come about, for which the obligation 
of declaring a state of war has been laid 
down." 
19. Rumania's behavior prior to or at the out-
break of general war in Europe in all likelihood 
would be based primarily on a calculation of its own 
interests rather than those of the Pact. Its "so-
cialist" outlook might make it initially sympathetic 
to Moscow, particularly if the causes of the conflict 
were obscure, but this outlook would not be an 
overriding factor in the final decision to commit 
Rumanian armed forces. Rumania probably would 
try to prevent any attempt by Soviet troops to cross 
Rumanian territory covertly prior to hostilities and 
would be tempted to give the West valuable, perhaps 
critical, early warning. After the outbreak of 
hostilities, Rumania probably would not permit its 
troops to be committed outside its borders and 
might be unwilling to make its oil available to 
Pact armor. Any sign of NATO military success 
would stir memories of Rumania's dubious military 
tradition and its deep distaste for the Soviet-
dominated Warsaw Pact alliance. 
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